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Employer Lawsuits Against Employees-The 
Right To Invoke The Legal Process Despite 
Anti-Union Motivation Or Coercive Effect On 
Section 7 Rights 
On November 15, 1974, John E. Sanford was discharged by 
Power Systems, Inc. for failing to perform his assigned work as a 
mill-might on a turbine generator disassembly crew.' Sanford 
filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), 
alleging he had been fired because of union activity. The Board 
officer in charge of Subregion 38, however, refused to issue a 
complaint against Power Systems since he found no evidence 
that Sanford had been discharged for engaging in protected con- 
duct. Sanford's subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Office of 
Appeals of the General Counsel. Approximately eighteen months 
later, Sanford filed similar charges with the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), alleging that complaints he 
had filed regarding unsafe working conditions had motivated his 
dismissal. These charges were dismissed by the Department of 
Labor? 
Power Systems subsequently discovered that Sanford had 
filed unfair labor practice charges against labor organizations 
and former employers in forty-six separate cases since 1967.' 
Excluding the instant decision, only one case had resulted in a 
Board order; the remaining forty-four cases had either been 
withdrawn, dismissed, or ~e t t l ed .~  Power Systems filed a civil 
complaint against Sanford on September 6, 1977, alleging that 
he had filed charges with the Board and OSHA without probable 
cause with the intention of harassing Power Systems. 
Power Systems sought recovery of legal fees incurred in de- 
1. Sanford, a union steward, had engaged in protected activity "which disrupted the 
job and caused it to fall seriously behind schedule." Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 
445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F. 2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979). 
2. 239 N.L.R.B. at 445-46. 
3. Id. at  446. Thirty cases involved charges against labor organizations and the re- 
mainder involved charges against employers. Id. See also Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 
601 F.2d 936, 937 (1979). 
4. Charges were voluntarily withdrawn by Sanford in 27 cases, the board dismissed 
the charges in 13 cases, and four cases were settled. One case led to a Board Order. 
Power Systems, Inc. represented the 46th action filed by Sanford. 239 N.L.R.B. at 446. 
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fending these charges as well as a permanent injunction en- 
joining Sanford from filing cases in any federal, state, or admin- 
istrative court against them." However, the Board held that by 
suing Sanford, Power Systems had violated section 8(a)(l) and 
(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA): since such ac- 
tion had "the unlawful objective of penalizing Sanford for filing 
a charge with the Board, and thus, depriving him of, and dis- 
couraging [other] employees from seeking access to the Board's 
pro~esses."~ The Board required Power Systems to withdraw its 
suit against Sanford and to make Sanford whole for all legal ex- 
penses he incurred in the defense of Power Systems' l a ~ s u i t . ~  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce 
the Board's order, finding no evidence of improper motive on 
the part of Power Systems in filing its complaint against 
Sanford.' 
A. Clyde Taylor Co. 
In Clyde Taylor Co.,1° Mr. Taylor was the superintendent of 
the sheet metal department in a mechanical contracting firm 
that was owned and operated by a partnership. In April, 1958, 
the partnership dissolved, and arrangements were made with 
Taylor to take over the sheet metal business.ll He immediately 
exercised employer prerogative by firing the union stewardla and 
by informing the remaining employees that they "could continue 
5. Id. On December 20, 1979, the request for an injunction was deleted. Id. at 446- 
47. 
6. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - 
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 
. . . .  
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he 
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter . . . . 
29 U.S.C. 8 158(a)(l), (4) (1976). 
7. 239 N.L.R.B. at  449. 
8. Id. at 450. 
9. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1979). 
10. 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960). 
11. Id. at 104. 
12. Id. at 105. Frank Houston, the union steward, had filed grievances with the 
Board "concerning Taylor's alleged hiring of too many apprentices and his use of un- 
qualified laborers to do sheet metal work." Id. One employee testified that prior to Hous- 
ton's discharge, Taylor had warned that " 'Frank Houston was getting too big for his own 
good in this union business and it looked like he was going to let him go.' " Id. 
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to work for him unless 'they wanted to stick with the Union.' "lS 
Four employees, who expressed allegiance to the Union, were 
paid in full and instructed " 'to get their tools and get out.' "I4 
Shortly thereafter, Taylor applied for and obtained a state court 
injunction banning picketing by the Union.l5 
Unfair labor practice charges were subsequently filed 
against Taylor. The trial examiner heard testimony that Taylor 
had told one of the charging parties that he should not have 
signed charges against him, that the employees had caused him 
public embarrassment, and that they " 'were opening [them- 
selves] wide open to a libel suit.' "I6 The Board adopted the trial 
examiner's conclusion that Taylor impliedly threatened to sue 
for libel in retaliation for the charges filed against him, "and 
that the threat, in the context made, constitute[d] an unfair la- 
bor practice."17 However, the Board insisted that by condemning 
threats it did not question the normal right of all persons to re- 
sort to the civil courts to adjudicate their claims.l8 
In fact, the Board rejected the trial examiner's finding that 
Taylor had violated Section B(a)(l) of the NLRA by obtaining 
the state court injunction banning peaceful picketing? The trial 
examiner had relied on the Board's earlier decision in W.T. 
Carter & Bro.,'O which held that an employer's use of legal pro- 
ceedings to discourage employees from exercising their rights 
under the NLRA rather than to advance any legitimate interest 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 106. 
16. Id. at  108. Taylor asked the employee " 'to talk to some of the boys and try to 
get them to drop it.' " Id. 
17. Id. The Board stated that: 
Such a threat, express or implied, is of a harassing nature. It would normally 
tend to intimidate an individual contemplating filing a charge, from doing so, 
or one, who has filed a charge, to withdraw it. Accordingly, we agre [sic] with 
the Trial Examiners that such a threat restrains employees in the exercise of 
the right to file charges under the Act and thus is coercive and violative of 
Section 8(a) (1). 
Id. 
18. "We interdict here only the making of a threat by an employer to resort to the 
civil courts as a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of rights guaran- 
teed by the Act." Id. (emphasis added). Had Taylor simply filed an action for libelous 
publication rather than threatened such action against the complaining employees, the 
Board arguably would have found no unfair labor practice, notwithstanding an ostensible 
bad faith motive to harass and intimidate them. 
19. Id. at 109. 
20. 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950). 
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of his own, was an unfair labor practice." The Board had stated 
in Carter that a person's right to resort to the courts-was not 
absolute but was restricted by the law of abuse of process.2a 
Thus, if an employer's lawsuit evinced an underlying anti-union 
motive, it was labeled an abuse of process, rejected as an invalid 
exercise of a protected right, and rendered susceptible to cen- 
sure as coercive conduct constituting an unfair labor practice." 
Clyde Taylor expressly overruled Carter. The Board em- 
phasized Chairman Herzog's dissent in Carter which insisted 
"that the Board should accommodate its enforcement of the Act 
to the right of all persons to litigate their claims in court, rather 
than condemn the exercise of such right as an unfair labor 
pra~tice."~~ 
Board member Fanning, who wrote a concurring opinion in 
Clyde Taylor, was the sole defender of the abuse of process ra- 
tionale in Carter. Although he agreed with the Board's ultimate 
result in Clyde Taylor, he argued that factual distinctions made 
it unnecessary to overrule Carter. He found the employer's con- 
duct in Carter to be more pervasive than Tay10r's~~ and was im- 
pressed that Taylor's actual use of civil proceedings did not bear 
a sufficiently close relationship to the achievement of anti-union 
objectives. Fanning agreed that an employer's threatened legal 
action constitutes an unfair labor practice, but he also insisted 
that an employer's actual lawsuit brought in bad faith against 
his employees renders an otherwise legitimate exercise of the ab- 
solute right to resort to the courts a violation of section 8(a)(l) 
of the NLRA? Nevertheless, the doctrine articulated by the 
21. Id. at 2024. 
22. It is "an abuse of legal process when such process is invoked in bad faith." Id. 
23. Id. at 2024, see id. at  2023. 
24. 127 N.L.R.B. at 109. 
25. In Carter, the trial examiner had found that the employer also violated 5 8(a)(l) 
by: 
(1) refusing to permit the holding of the outdoor meetings on company prop- 
erty; (2) causing peace officers to prevent such meetings; (3) following union 
organizers when they drove through the streets of the company-owned town; 
and (4) using a reporter to take notes at two open union meetings. 
Id. 
26. Member Fanning was "not persuaded by the record that [Taylor] resorted to the 
State court for injunctive relief in bad faith, that is, to defeat union organization of his 
employees rather than to protect any legitimate interest of his own," and therefore voted 
with other members of the Board to dismiss the allegation that Taylor violated § 8(a)(l) 
of the NLRA. Id. at 110. Member Fanning joined the Chairman and other members of 
the Board in holding that Taylor's threat to sue for libel interfered with, restrained, and 
coerced employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by 5 7 of the NLRA. Id. See 
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majority in Clyde Taylor became a fortress protecting employers 
whose use of legal processes may have intentionally or uninten- 
tionally chilled employee exercise of section 7 rights. 
In a related case decided by the Supreme Court, Textile 
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. CO.,'' the majority recog- 
nized a right of managerial prerogative, the exercise of which 
would not violate section B(a)(l) of the NLRA even though there 
might be some coincidental interference with section 7 rights. 
The Court concluded that an employer's decision to go out of 
business-even if completely motivated by anti-union animus 
-does not amount to an unfair labor practice." Thus, the Su- 
preme Court created an exception to the NLRA sections that 
restrict employer freedom, an exception built "around the non- 
statutory concept of management prer~gatives.''~~ By implica- 
tion the Court established a category of business decisions that 
section S(a)(l) and its companion subsections of the NLRA 
could not restrict. An employer's right to sue in civil court may 
fall within the protected area of management prerogative. 
B. United Aircraft Corp.: The Board Refines the Rule 
Regarding Threats 
In United Aircraft Gorp.," the Board was called upon to 
review the propriety of an employer's threat of legal action to 
achieve a stronger bargaining position against its affiliated 
union.31 Employees had previously filed charges with the Board, 
claiming that company supervisors at United Aircraft had en- 
gaged in unfair labor practices by threatening economic reprisals 
and by offering benefits conditioned upon abandonment of a 
strike." In an attempt to induce the charging parties to with- 
draw their unfair labor practice charges, United Aircraft 
threatened civil action based on numerous legal claims that had 
arisen during a bitter strike against the company in 1960.3s 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976). 
27. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
28. Id. at 270. 
29. Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REV. 133,145 
(1974). 
30. 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 383. 
33. Id. at 384. Union members resorted to violence during the strike, causing prop- 
erty damage to homes and cars. Threatening phone calls were also made, intimidating 
employees desirous of returning to work United Aircraft Corp. v. I.A.M., 70 L.R.R.M. 
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When the employees refused to drop their charges, United Air- 
craft brought an action against them in Connecticut Superior 
Court and secured judgments in excess of one million dollars? 
The employees amended their initial complaint, alleging 
that United Aircraft committed additional unfair labor practices 
by threatening to bring suit unless the unions withdrew their 
charges, and by actually bringing suit when the unions ulti- 
mately refused to capitulate, thereby coercing and restraining its 
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rightsP The Board, 
relying upon a literal interpretation of Clyde Taylor, dismissed 
the allegations that United Aircraft's actual lawsuit constituted 
an unfair labor practice. It reasoned that although a threat of 
legal action "calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of 
their rights" is a violation of section 8(a)(l), an actual suit is not 
similarly ~ n l a w f u l . ~ ~  With continuing confidence in its prior in- 
terpretation of Clyde Taylor, the Board further concluded that 
United Aircraft's threat to file suit unless a settlement agree- 
ment was reached did not constitute the kind of tactic normally 
used to restrain employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed 
by the NLRA." The Board viewed the opposing claims of the 
employer and the employees as potentially offsetting. It theo- 
rized, under what appears to be a common law notion of setoff:8 
that a threat to bring a civil action as part of a good-faith effort 
to negotiate a settlement of numerous claims, "with each party 
giving up its claims against the other," is not unlawful under the 
NLRA? On appeal?O the Second Circuit approved the Board's 
2577, 2578 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hartford Cty. 1968). 
34. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. The Board reiterated its well established rationale "that 'the Board should 
accommodate its enforcement of the Act to the right of all persons to litigate their claims 
in court, rather than condemn the exercise of such right as an unfair labor practice.' " Id. 
(quoting Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. at  109). "The Board has consistently held that the 
filing of a civil suit cannot be found to be an unfair labor practice." Id. (footnote omit- 
ted). The Board's decision was upheld on appeal. Lodges 743 and 1746, Intl  Ass'n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. United Aircraft, 534 F.2d 422, 464 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
37. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384 (quoting Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. at 108). 
38. Setoff is defined as a defense or independent claim made by a defendant to 
counterbalance that of the plaintiff. Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 
(1913). It is sometimes characterized as a "mode of defense whereby the defendant ac- 
knowledges the justice of the plaintiff's demands on the one hand, but on the other, sets 
up a demand of his own to counterbalance it, either in whole or in part." 20 AM. JUR. 2~ 
Counterclaim, Recoupment, a d  Setoff 5 2 (1965) (footnote omitted). 
39. 192 N.L.R.B. at 384. 
40. Lodges 743 and 1746, Intl  Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. United 
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reasoning and observed: 
[Tlhe "threats" in this case were not conveyed by an employer 
to a single employee; they were an integral part of negotiations 
in which both sides were represented by sophisticated labor 
counsel who were more than familiar with the rights of the par- 
ties, and particularly the right to file unfair labor practice 
charges with the Board." 
The employer was credited with having a legitimate cause of ac- 
tion against his employees that he was willing to forego if they in 
turn would withdraw their unfair labor practice charges." 
In 1972 the Board decided West Point Pepperell, Inc.,(' a 
case involving an employer's threat to sue its afliliated union un- 
less unfair labor practice charges filed against the employer were 
withdrawd4 The employer advanced several legal theories justi- 
fying his threatened civil action against the union? The em- 
ployer, in essence, had admonished the union to either accept 
Aircraft, 534 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
41. Id. at 464. 
42. Id. The Board had quoted Judge Gaffney who concluded in his Connecticut Su- 
perior Court decision that the employer did not "use these lawsuits for bargaining pur- 
poses to induce the defendanta to withdraw their claims in their action in the United 
States District Court." 192 N.L.R.B. at 384 n.13 (quoting United Aircraft Corp., 70 
L.R.R.M. at 2577,2580). In essence, the state court found no express or implied purpose 
to use actual litigation to induce the charging parties to drop their unfair labor practice 
charges. The State Court, however, did not address the employer's use of threats prior to 
the actual lawsuit as a means of pressuring union members to abandon their unfair labor 
practice claims against the employer. 
43. 200 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1972). 
44. Id. at 1039. 
45. The employer in West Point Pepperell alleged, inter alia, that the union 
breached its contract by filing charges against the employer. Although the Board did not 
discuss in detail the contractual agreement between the union and the employer, it criti- 
cized any provision in a contract that would prohibit access to the Board by a com- 
plaining party. Such a "prohibition as a mutter of public policy would not be binding on 
the Board, nor, it would appear, on the Union." Id. (emphasis in original). The employer 
also contended that the unfair labor practices charges filed by the union were unmer- 
itorious. The Board stated, however, that " 'access to the Board's processes for vindica- 
tion of a statutory violation is fundamental and is to be kept open without roadblocks or 
hindrance. Neither employer nor union may restrain, coerce or interfere with that right, 
whether or not it deems the charge meritorious-a question for the Board, not a charged 
party, to decide. See Local 138, Intl Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 148 
N.L.R.B. 679,681.' " Id. (quoting W .  T .  Grant Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 93,96 (1967)). In addi- 
tion, the Board in West Point Pepperell cited, inter alia, Waterman Industries Inc., 91 
N.L.R.B. 1041, 1043 n.8 (1950) (does not matter even if charge proved invalid after trial 
on the merits and N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 404 U.S. 821 (1972) (all persons with informa- 
tion concerning unfair labor practices are to be free from coercion in bringing them 
before the Board). 
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the contention that the union's unfair labor practice charges 
were unlawful and withdraw them, or face the costly conse- 
quences of a lawsuit.46 The Board concluded that the employer's 
threat was without legal foundation and that it constituted a 
bad faith attempt to clothe with the integrity of the legal pro- 
cess the employer's designs to interfere with, coerce, and restrain 
its employees in the exercise of their protected rights under the 
NLRA." The Board rejected the employer's reliance on United 
Aircraft by distinguishing the ostensible groundlessness of the 
threatened legal action in West Point Pepperell from the un- 
questionable legitimacy of the legal claims asserted against the 
union in United Aircraft Corp. The Board found West Point 
Pepperell's threat to be "retaliatory in nature, as in Taylor, and 
not remotely connected with a conciliatory move, as in United 
Aircra f t."48 
46. The Board has consistently found it to be an unfair labor prictice for an em- 
ployer to threaten employees with legal action in an attempt to hinder employees from 
exercising their rights under $ 8 of the NLRA. For example, in S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 
229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977), the employer's supervisor told the employee that if rumors of 
her union membership became known to the manager she would be fired. She repeated 
this conversation at  two separate employee meetings. During the course of the second, 
the company president told her to "'shut her mouth' because she could be sued for 
saying such things." Id. at 79. The Board held this threat to be coercive and thus viola- 
tive of $ 8(a)(l). But see Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960). 
47. The trial examiner stated, "I am convinced and find from the timing of the let- 
ter [threatening to file suit] in relation to the filing of the charge, and from the contents 
of the letter, that the letter was touched off by the charge and was substantially if not 
entirely directed at it." 200 N.L.R.B. at  1039. There is a clear distinction between negoti- 
ating to setoff opposing well-founded legal claims to avoid the inevitable cost and incon- 
venience of multiple proceedings and grasping at straws to substantiate a threat of a 
retaliatory lawsuit unless unfair labor practice charges are dropped. In a case involving a 
union's threat to file a lawsuit againat an employer for breach of a subcontracting clause 
in their collective bargaining agreement, the purpose of the threat being to coerce the 
employer to cease doing business with a non-union subcontractor, the Board recognized 
the existence of a legitimate cause of action for breach of contract and concluded that 
the threat was not "a groundless threat simply calculated to unlawfully harass and co- 
erce the Company." Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 217 N.L.R.B. 946,949 
(1975). The Board reasoned that the union was entitled to enforce the terms of the col- 
lective bargaining agreement in a competent jurisdiction and logically had a concomitant 
right to threaten such action in order to give the employer an opportunity to abide by 
the contract and avoid a lawsuit. Id. at 948. 
48. 200 N.L.R.B. at 1040. "Unlike United Aircraft, there was here no implied recog- 
nition of the statutory right to file a charge and in that context a suggested 'tradeoff' or 
settlement of confiicting claims growing out of a strike." Id. 
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C.  Refinement of the Absolute Right to Sue 
In Fashion Fair, I ~ C . , ' ~  decided in 1964, the Board exhib- 
ited remarkable obeisance to a literal interpretation of Clyde 
Taylor. There was ample evidence on the record that Fashion 
Fair had been motivated primarily by anti-union animus in ob- 
taining a state court injunction banning peaceful picketing. The 
Board determined that the injunction obtained by Fashion Fair 
was without a legal basis under Indiana law and was "essentially 
motivated by [a] continuing aversion to the Union and by a de- 
sire to harass the picketers in the exercise of their protected con- 
certed activitie~."~~ Nevertheless, the Board sustained its ex- 
isting policy of not enforcing the NLRA in a manner that 
impinged upon the right of all persons to litigate their claims in 
court;" it did not attempt to distinguish the facts from those in 
Clyde Taylor. It appeared that any lingering notions of motive 
and intents2 as controlling factors in judging employer use of le- 
gal processes to achieve management objectives suffered a gen- 
eral coup de grace at the hands of the Board in Fashion Fair.6s 
49. 159 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1964). 
50. Id. at 1449. 
51. Id. 
52. The Board a r m e d  the trial examiner's decision in Television Wisconsin, Inc., 
224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976), which included a footnote stating that "[iln Taylor the Board 
distinguished between threat to sue and the filing of a suit without seemingly distin- 
guishing between the intent behind them." Id. at 780 n.80. 
53. If there ever was an opportunity to apply Member Fanning's ostensible adher- 
ence to Carter and the legitimate motivation test advanced in his concurring opinion in 
Ctyde Taylor, this would be the case. The unfair labor practices perpetrated by the em- 
ployer in Fashion Fair, Inc. correspond qualitatively to those in Carter and, according to 
Member Fanning, would be distinguishable from conduct in Clyde Taylor since they 
"bear a closer relationship to the obtaining of injunctive relief." Clyde Taylor Co., 127 
N.L.R.B. 103, 110 (1960). The Board, however, adopted the majority view in Clyde Tay- 
lor and acknowledged an apparent absolute right to invoke the legal process in spite of 
anti-union animus. 
In D.C. International Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1383 (1967), the Board approved the trial 
examiner's reliance on Clyde Taylor in dismissing alleged unfair labor practice charges 
against an employer who requested police officers to arrest a discharged employee who 
refused to leave company property. The employee claimed that his arrest was spawned 
by unfair labor practice charges he had filed against his former employer for discrimina- 
tory termination of employment. In a footnote accompanying his decision, the trial ex- 
aminer displayed his confidence in the well accepted rule of Clyde Taylor: 
Were I not convinced that the principle of Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 
required dismissal of the allegation herein, I would recommend dismissal of the 
allegation on the basis that the preponderance of the evidence does not reveal 
that the Respondent [employer] caused Stanley's arrest because he had filed 
unfair labor practices under the Act with the Board. 
Id. at 1394 11.14. The trial examiner considered the rule in Clyde Taylor to be an abso- 
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The supposed coup de grace was short lived as the Board 
has revived a motive and intent test in a series of cases featuring 
unfair labor practice allegations against unions for filing lawsuits 
against their members to enforce disciplinary fines (hereinafter 
referred to as the "union-plaintiff cases"). In Retail Clerks 
Union Local 770," the Board held that resort to the courts to 
confirm an arbitrator's award and enforce an alleged contract 
right was not violative of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(a) of the NLRA 
since the union acted in good faith? However, in United Stan- 
ford Employees, Local 680," the Board held that a lawsuit seek- 
ing to compel employees to sign articles of membership in the 
union and to perform acts necessary to retain membership in the 
union constituted an unfair labor practice since the suit sought 
to enforce unlawful objectives." 
The Board reached a similar result in Television Wisconsin, 
I ~ C . , ~  where the Communications Workers of American sought 
judicial enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement that 
required employees as a condition of employment to meet obli- 
gations beyond the payment of dues and initiation fees. Since 
such obligations-imposed by an unlawful union security clause 
and a separate clause restraining employees from exercising 
their right to cross picket lines-were illegal under the NLRA, 
the Board held that legal action taken by the union to enforce 
them constituted a violation of sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2). 
In Television Wisconsin, Inc., the trial examiner concluded that 
"the rationale of the Retail Clerks case [suggests that the Clyde 
Taylor] holding has been substantially modified and that the 
Board has narrowed its accommodation of its enforcement of the 
Act to the right of all persons to litigate their claims in 
This narrowing of the Clyde Taylor doctrine of accommoda- 
lute rule guaranteeing the right to invoke legal processes and precluding an exploration 
of the facts to discern motive, intenf, or anti-union animus. Only in the absence of Clyde 
Taylor would the trial examiner feel compelled to examine the employer's state of mind 
and underlying purpose in invoking the legal process against Stanley, his employee. 
54. 218 N.L.R.B. 680 (1975). 
55. The court determined the action "was held not to be the kind of tactic caku- 
hted to restrain employees or employers in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the 
Act." Id. at  683 (emphasis added). 
56. 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977). 
57. Id. "This was an unlawful objective inasmuch as the Act permits unions to im- 
pose only financial core obligations on employees in the administration of contractual 
union-security provisions." Id. at  331. 
58. 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976). 
59. Id. at 780. 
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tion has not been limited to legal action taken by unions against 
their members. The Board, for example, has also refused to ac- 
commodate its enforcement of the NLRA to the right of a land- 
owner to engage state police support to prevent peaceful picket- 
ing on private property leased to an employer. Recognizing the 
right of employees to picket their employer at his primary loca- 
tion, the Board held in Frank ViscegliasO that restriction of ac- 
cess to such property-motivated by anti-union animus and ac- 
complished in part by requesting police arrests of employees 
who persisted in picketing-constituted a violation of section 
S(a)(l).@l Lawsuits attempting to enforce obviously unlawful 
objectives, whether pursued by unions, employers, or anyone 
else, were declared to be outside the fortress erected by Clyde 
Taylor around one's absolute right to invoke the legal process.6a 
11. Power Systems Inc.: IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF ANTI- 
UNION MOTIVATION 
In Power Systems, Inc.,bVhe Board found that because 
Power System's lawsuit had been filed without probable cause 
and had been motivated by anti-union animus, it was not privi- 
leged by the Board's Clyde Taylor policy of "accommodating its 
processes to the normal right of all parties to resort to the civil 
courts" to adjudicate their  claim^.^ The Board ordered Power 
60. 203 N.L.R.B. 265 (1973). 
61. Id. The Board reasoned that the Respondent's lease to the employer, accompa- 
nied by a right of access granted to employees of the lessee, gave employees a parallel 
right of access for picketing. The road was a "limited access road" indicating the respon- 
dent's intent to permit its use by classes of persons acceptable to the respondent. Em- 
ployees of the lessee were necessarily contemplated members of that class, and the re- 
spondent's resort to legal processes, i.e., requesting arrests of picketing employees 
constituted interference with the employee's exercise of 8 7 rights. Id. at 266-67. 
62. See, e.g., Int'l. Org. of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976). 
There the administrative law judge concluded that the union's action was "an after- 
thought, constituting a strategem to mask Respondents' real intent." Id. at 1626 n.2. The 
union's lawsuit was found to have been filed in pursuit of unlawful objectives, and there- 
fore unprotected by the Clyde Taylor doctrine. The District of Columbia Circuit con- 
h e d  the Board's decision adding that the language in Clyde Taylor 
does not indicate that the filing of a lawsuit will never be regarded as an unfair 
labor practice . . . . Rather, the language is, in our view, a mere expression of 
a general liberality in accommodating the filing of lawsuits. Where, as here, the 
lawsuit . . . was intimately related to ongoing picketing for an unlawful objec- 
tive . . . we can see no inconsistency between Clyde Taylor Co. [and its pro- 
geny] and the Board's determination in this instance. 
Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 896, 906-07 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
63. 239 N.L.R.B. 445 (1978). 
64. Id. at 449. 
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Systems to refrain from prosecuting its state court action against 
Sanford and ordered Power Systems to reimburse Sanford for 
the costs he incurred in defending against the lawsuit. 
The Board explained its departure from a literal application 
of Clyde Taylor on the basis of Retail Clerks, United Stanford 
Employees, and Television Wisconsin, Inc., which teach that 
lawsuits brought in furtherance of "unlawful objectives" are not 
accorded Clyde Taylor protecti~n.'~ The Board apparently at- 
tempted to distinguish between lawsuits nourished by hostility 
toward employee exercise of section 7 rights and lawsuits that 
are not used tactically to restrain employees from exercising 
such rights." 
In refusing to enforce the Board's order against Power Sys- 
tem, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that its holding was a nar- 
row one.'? It had merely concluded upon a review of the whole 
record that insufficient evidence existed to support the Board's 
finding that Power. Systems filed its lawsuit without probable 
cause and for an improper purpose. The court did not question 
the Board's salient departure from its well-established policy of 
strictly accomodating one's right of access to the courts.68 In 
addition, it failed to examine whether the Board possessed 
power to censure an employer's lawsuit against his employee as 
an unfair labor practice. 
111. CRITICISM - o ~  Power Systems Inc. 
In Power Systems Inc., the Board wanted to engraft motive 
and intent onto the Clyde Taylor rule, even though Clyde Tay- 
lor wielded the scalpel by which they were severed from the 
traditional process of detecting an unfair labor practice. By 
focusing upon the coercive effect of Power Systems' lawsuit 
65. Id. at 449-50. The Board acknowledged that it had "on several occasions de- 
parted from a literal application of Clyde Taylor where the civil lawsuit was brought in 
order to pursue an unlawful objective." Id. at 449. While each of those cases dealt with a 
lawsuit filed by a labor union, the Board concluded that there is "no reason to apply a 
different standard to an employer that institutes a civil lawsuit with an unlawful objec- 
tive against an employee." Id. at 450. 
66. Id. at 449-50. 
67. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979). 
68. The court observed that "the Board did not reject the principle in Clyde Taylor, 
. . . that the filing of a civil complaint by an employer or labor organization against an 
employee or member does not violate the Act." Id. at 938. While the the Board did not 
expressly reject Clyde Taylor, it departed from the traditional application of the Clyde 
Taylor principle of protecting an employer's absolute right to invoke the legal process. 
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against its employees and by defining it as an "unlawful objec- 
tive," the Board found an unfair labor practice despite the im- 
plied charge in Clyde Taylor to avoid scrutinizing the intent or 
motive underlying one's resort to the legal process. The Board 
appears to have tacitly applied the abuse of process doctrine and 
consequently to have returned to its position in Carter without 
admitting it?@ 
The Board refused to acknowledge Power Systems' legal 
claim as an action brought in good faith, even though it ex- 
pressed a proper purpose on its face. The Board looked beyond 
the legal objectives of the lawsuit to scrutinize underlying mo- 
tives and divine the actual purpose for which it was filed. This 
simply amounts to a revival of Carter and its attendant abuse of 
process limitation on an employer's absolute right to invoke the 
legal process.70 
69. Recall that Carter limited an employer's absolute right to resort to the courts 
"by the law of malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings." 90 
N.L.R.B. at 2024. Malicious prosecution consists of any proceeding of a criminal charac- 
ter initiated without probable cause, with malice, or a primary purpose other than 
achieving just prosecution of an offender. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 
835 (4th ed. 1971). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $8 653,672 (1972). The Board 
is usually concerned with "wrongful initiation of civil proceedings" or abuse of procesa 
rather than malicious prosecution. The authors of the Restatement have articulated a 
distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of process: 
[Abuse of process] is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the 
wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, 
no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was 
designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was prop- 
erly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought 
with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings 
terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subse- 
quent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the miscon- 
duct for which the liability is imposed under the rule. Id. 8 682, Comment a. 
70. Member Fanning, who dissented in Clyde Taylor and argued against overruling 
Carter, is now Chairman of the NLRB. The motive and intent analysis he adhered to in 
Clyde Taylor now forms a large part of the Board's analysis. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Board in Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 
936 (7th Cir. 1979). The court, however, intimated "no view on the scope of the Board's 
power to determine, in circumstances other than those presented [in the instant case], 
that the filing of a civil action based upon the defendant's charge filed with the Board is 
an unfair labor practice." Id. at 940. Instead, it merely rejected the Board's findings of 
fact regarding Power System's bad faith motive in pursuing an action in court for the 
purpose of chilling an employee's exercise of 8 7 rights. Id. The court recognized "that 
civil actions for malicious prosecution carry with them a potential for chilling employee 
compaints to the Board and that the Board may, in a proper case, act to curb such 
conduct." Id. 
EMPLOYER LAWSUITS 
A. Abuse of Process Theory Misapplied 
Abuse of process has traditionally been found only where 
the legal process is used "against another primarily to accom- 
plish a purpose for which it is not designed."?' Dean Prosser 
identifies the essential elements of abuse of process as "first, an 
ulterior purpose, and second, a willful act in the use of the pro- 
cess not proper in the regular conduct of the pr~ceeding."~Wot- 
withstanding "an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior pur- 
pose or benefit" to the employer, there is no "abuse of process 
when the process is used for the purpose for which it is in- 
tended."?' The improper purpose element of common law abuse 
of process "usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collat- 
eral advantage, not properly invoked in the process itself, by 
. . . the use of process as a threat or a club."?' 
The abuse of process doctrine is highly susceptible to mis- 
application when employed in adjudicating emotionally charged 
labor relations conflicts. Enforcement of the NLRA presupposes 
a struggle between management and labor to achieve self-serving 
political and financial objectives-a rivalry typically fraught 
with feelings of contempt and distrust. Consequently, a lawsuit 
filed by an employer against an employee or a union is intui- 
tively clothed with a shroud of suspect bad motive, tempting the 
Board to find an unfair labor practice. 
In Clyde Taylor the Board correctly regarded Taylor's un- 
fettered right of access to the courts to sue employees for 
libelous statements published against him. Yet the Board was 
also correct in declaring Taylor's threat to sue, a club he wielded 
over the heads of his employees to obtain collateral advantage, 
to be beyond the protection accorded his right to invoke the le- 
gal 
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS g 682 (1974) (emphasis added). Abuse of pro- 
cess consists of "misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than 
that which it was designed to accomplish." W. PROSSER, supra note 69, at  856 (footnote 
omitted). 
72. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, at  857 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 682, Comment b (1971). 
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, at  857. "There is, in other words, a form of extor- 
tion, and i t  is what is done in the course of negotiating rather than the issuance or any 
formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort." Id. See F. HARPER & F. 
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 331 (1956). (One commits a tort the moment he attempts to 
achieve some collateral objective outside the scope and operation of the process 
employed.) 
75. A willful misapplication of process contemplates a "definite act or threat not 
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In Fashion Fair, Inc. the Board properly adhered to the 
rule formulated in Clyde Taylor. Notwithstanding the em- 
ployer's obvious aversion to the union and his unquestionable 
intention to "harass the picketers in the exercise of their pro- 
tected concerted a~tivi t ies"~~ by pursuing a state court injunc- 
tion, the Board found no abuse of process since the employer 
used the legal process for the purpose for which it was intended 
and did not engage in collateral coercive conduct.77 
Proper limitation of the abuse of process theory was also 
demonstrated by the Board's decision in United Aircraft Corp., 
which was subsequently a r m e d  by the Second Circuit. The 
Board not only acknowledged the validity of United Aircraft's 
actual suit against the union, but concluded that its threat to 
sue unless opposing charges were withdrawn was also permissi- 
ble since it was directly related to a good faith attempt to nego- 
tiate a setoff of claims.78 Quoting the Board's Chairman Herzog, 
the Second Circuit concluded in Lodges 743 and 1746, Interna- 
tional Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft C ~ r p . , ~ @  that 
despite probable improper motivation for both threatening to 
bring and actually bringing a lawsuit against the union, "the 
'Board should accommodate its enforcement of the statute to 
the traditional right of all to bring their contentions to the at- 
tention of a judicial forum, rather than hold it to be an unfair 
labor practice for them to attempt to do so.' 
The Court rejected the application of the abuse of process 
doctrine to defeat an employer's right to resort to legal processes 
just because anti-union objectives may be inevitably furthered: 
But even if we assume that the Company was improperly moti- 
vated-that it intended the suit to induce the Union to with- 
draw its charges-this alone would not make resort to the 
authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the pro- 
cess." W. PROSSER, supra note 69, at 857. The Board in Clyde Taylor gave judicial effect 
to this interpretation of the doctrine by declaring a threat to sue, calculated to inhibit 
employees in the exercise of their rights, to be an unfair labor practice. An actual suit, 
however, processed to ita designed end, could not constitute an unfair labor practice. 
76. 159 N.L.R.B. at 1449 (footnote omitted). 
77. The Board acknowledged the anti-union motivation accompanying the em- 
ployer's lawsuit but implicitly rejected any application of abuse of process theory to chal- 
lenge his right to resort to legal process. Id. 
78. 192 N.L.R.B. at  384. Cf. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1039 
(1972) (threat to sue was motivated purely by anti-union animus and responded directly 
to the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the union). 
79. 534 F.2d 422 (2d. Cir. 1965). 
80. Id. at 464 (quoting Carter, 90 N.L.FLB. at 2029). 
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courts unlawful so as to justify an unfair labor practice finding. 
Abuse of process requires more than simply improper motive. 
There must also be some action taken to utilize the court's 
processes for collateral purposes not related to the suit in 
In short, the abuse of process doctrine should only defeat an em- 
ployer's right to resort to the courts when coercive measures are 
employed that are unnecessary to the pursuit of judicial 
 proceeding^.^^ 
B. The Board's Improper Reliance on the Union-Plaintiff 
Cases 
In condemning Power Systems' lawsuit as an unfair labor 
practice, the Board found support for its decision in the series of 
union-plaintiff cases which had censured the use of legal process 
to accomplish "unlawful objectives," such as compelling employ- 
ees to accept union obligations beyond the scope of the NLRA,M 
enforcing illegal union-security clauses:4 and restraining or co- 
ercing employers in the selection of representatives for collec- 
tive-bargaining purposes.86 In each instance a labor organization 
was held to have invoked the legal process to pursue an end hav- 
ing no legal foundation. In focusing its attention on the illicit 
purposes of the lawsuits in these cases, the Board curiously 
failed to distinguish malicious use of process, the tort actually 
committed in these cases, from abuse of process, the only plausi- 
ble tort supported by the facts in Power Systems, Inc. 
Abuse of process differs from malicious use of process in 
that the latter is committed by "commencing an action or caus- 
ing process to issue without jw t i f i ca t i~n ,"~  whereas the former 
81. Id. at 464-65 (footnote omitted). 
82. Id. at 465. 
83. United Stanford Employees, Local 680,232 N.L.R.B. 326,331 (1977) (union filed 
lawsuit seeking damages for breach of contract and compelling specific performance of 
oral employment contracta with employer which bound employees to accept union 
membership). 
84. Television Wisconsin, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722, 780 (1976) (civil action filed by 
union against employees who resigned from union as a means of collecting fines assessed 
for violation of union-security clause that exceeded the limited form permitted by the 
proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 
85. IOMMP, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626, 1634-35 (1976) (Union's in rem action against the 
ship owner's vessel had as its purpose the compulsion of owners to accept union's bar- 
gaining agreement and replace bargaining representative with union members). 
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 69, at  856 (emphasis added). 
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consists of exploitation of process issued with justification. 
Malicious use of process is the wrongful initiation of civil pro- 
ceedings against another "without probable cause, that is, with- 
out a reasonable basis for thinking the claim . . . asserted [is] 
valid."87 Abuse of process, on the other hand, is evidenced by 
conduct collateral to normal processes of a lawsuit that abuses 
an otherwise legitimate claim based on probable cause. 
The Board's overriding emphasis on motive and intent in 
deciding Power Systems, Inc. compounded this confusion in dis- 
tinguishing abuse of process from malicious use of process. 
Power Systems' lawsuit was legitimate on its face-the company 
sought to recover expenses incurred in defending charges filed 
maliciously and without probable cause by Sanford. The Board 
was nevertheless determined to make an issue out of Power Sys- 
tems' palpable antipathy toward Sanford and his use of the 
Board's processes. The Board explained its decision in Power . 
Systems, Inc. with language borrowed from the union-plaintiff 
cases. It declared that Power Systems "had no reasonable basis 
for the filing of its lawsuit9'-language that suggests a finding of 
malicious use of process.88 But in stating the facts, the Board 
described a proper legal action seeking a designated lawful re- 
sult, the objectives of which were neither illegal nor without a 
reasonable belief of validity.- The Board only assailed Power 
Systems' collateral objectives of penalizing Sanford for filing 
charges with the Board and discouraging employees from using 
the Board's processes. Intimating that Power Systems' lawsuit 
was otherwise legitimate, the Board concluded that it was never- 
theless an unfair labor practice since its true purpose was to 
punish Sanford for asserting his rights under the NLRA and to 
restrain him from asserting those rights in the future-an un- 
mistakable articulation of the elements of abuse of process.@0 
The Board's reliance on the union-plaintiff cases was inap- 
87. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 74, at  329. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS 8 682, Comment a (1972). 
88. 239 N.L.R.B. at  450. 
89. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 938-40 (7th Cir. 1979). 
90. See 239 N.L.R.B. at  450. In rejecting the Board's conclusion that employer's 
lawsuit was without a reasonable basis, the Seventh Circuit in Power Systems, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 601 F.2d 936,940 (7th Cir. 1979), suggests its approval of this latter characteriza- 
tion. The employer approached the Board prior to its initiation of the state court action 
to inquire whether its contemplated suit would violate the NLRA. This fact considered 
with the stipulated facts on the record negate any notion that Power Systems, Inc. pur- 
sued its action in state court without believing that it had a reasonable basis. 
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propriate since their departure from Clyde Taylor was uniquely 
based on an implicit finding of malicious use of process, whereas 
the Board in Power Systems, Inc. clearly articulated the ele- 
ments of abuse of process. Because no coercive collateral con- 
duct accompanied the lawsuit, and because ostensible anti-union 
motivation alone is insufficient to substantiate a finding of abuse 
of process,@' the Board was in the precarious position of finding 
one tort by analyzing the facts, calling it another name by 
straining precedent, and being unable to sustain either upon the 
record. The Board's confusion was caused by its renewed flirta- 
tion with the notions of motive and intent, a result that demon- 
strates the error of straying from a literal interpretation of 
Clyde Taylor. 
C. Managerial Prerogative and the Irrelevance of Motive 
and Intent 
An employer's decision to invoke the legal process is a busi- 
ness decision, an exclusive exercise of managerial prerogative. 
Section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA broadly restricts those exercises of 
managerial prerogative that tend "to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec- 
tion [7]" of the Act.- Anti-union motivation was initially an 
essential element of subsections 8(a)(2)-(5) but not subsection 
8(a)(l)." Judicial interpretations eventually blurred the distinc- 
tion concerning motive? Consequently, a balancing test consid- 
91. The Seventh Circuit's reversal of the Board's decision was very narrow; the 
court refused to comment on anything other than the lack of substantial evidence to 
support the Board's findings. Id. The confusion caused by the Board's misapplication of 
the abuse of process theory and the Seventh Circuit's refusal to comment on the correct 
application of the Clyde Taylor doctrine demonstrates the need for a closer examination 
by the Board and the courts of the direction taken by the Board. 
92. 29 U.S.C. 8 158(a)(l) (1976). 
93. See Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Labor Act: 
Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs, and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967). 
94. Id. at 496-97. Section 8(a) provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- 
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any 
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in 
any labor organization . . . 
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he 
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter; 
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ering motive and intent as determinative weights has been ap- 
plied under section 8(a)(l) as well as under other subsections 
dealing with particular instances of intentional discriminatory 
conduct.s6 An employer's bona fide interest in furthering mana- 
gerial objectives is typically weighed against the corresponding 
impact on employee rights under the NLRA. This emphasis on 
motive and intent in reviewing business decisions alleged to be 
in violation of the NLRA apparently caused the Board to adopt 
a similar mind-set in reviewing an employer's initiation of legal 
proceedings against employees. 
In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing 
Co.,@= the United States Supreme Court isolated a particular cat- 
egory of managerial prerogative, the exercise of which would not 
constitute a violation of section 8(a)(1) notwithstanding coinci- 
dental interference with section 7 rights. Justice Harlan's major- 
ity opinion declared that an employer's decision to go out of 
business, although inspired totally by anti-union animus, was 
not an unfair labor practice since the "proposition that a single 
businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to 
would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be 
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative in- 
tent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor 
Relations Act."@' A judicial exception was thus "engrafted upon 
the otherwise plain language of the respective sections limiting 
employer freedom, [an exception that] has been built around the 
nonstatutory concept of management  prerogative^."^^ Accord- 
ingly, the Court established by implication a category of busi- 
ness decisions that were intended to remain unscathed by sec- 
tion 8(a)(l) and its companion subsections.@@ 
The decision to invoke the legal process arguably represents 
the kind of managerial prerogative protected by Darlington, a 
right so fundamental to the concept of free enterprise that its 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ- 
ees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title. 
95. See Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REV. 
133, 137 (1974). 
96. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
97. Id. at 270. 
98. Rabin, supra note 95, at 145. 
99. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 US.  300 (1965). "[Wle have consist- 
ently construed the section to leave unscathed a wide range of employer action taken to 
serve legitimate business interests in some significant fashion, even though the Act com- 
mitted may tend to discourage union membership." Id. at 311. 
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deprivation should be considered only after the "clearest mani- 
festation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent 
so construing the Labor Relations Act."loO No such intent is 
manifest. 
Clyde Taylor implicitly rejected the use of a balancing test 
where an employer's interest in the private managerial function 
of initiating a lawsuit is weighed against the corresponding im- 
pact on employee rights under the NLRA. The Board concluded 
that in enforcing employee rights under the NLRA, it would ac- 
commodate the absolute right of all persons to litigate their 
claims in court. Such accommodation does not contemplate the 
traditional balancing approach employed in reviewing other 
types of business decisions that negatively impact on section 7 
rights. Accommodation signifies the attitude prescribed by the 
Supreme Court in Darlington. The Court stated, in effect, that 
it would accommodate its enforcement of the NLRA to the right 
of all employers to go out of business;101 it would abandon the 
balancing scales when the exercise of paramount rights of mana- 
gerial prerogative are challenged as unfair labor practices. In 
Clyde Taylor the Board announced its decision to accord the 
same presumptive protection to the specific right to invoke the 
legal process. The Board's anomalous departure from a literal 
interpretation of Clyde Taylor in Power Systems Inc. is either a 
manifestation of progressive atrophy in its ability to compre- 
hend the soundness of its prior reasoning, or an intentional re- 
turn to the Carter approach spawned by renewed veneration of a 
test based on motive and intent. In either case, the Board should 
have recognized after Darlington that only a literal application 
of Clyde Taylor is consistent with the policy established by the 
Supreme Court in this protected area of managerial prerogative. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Subsection 8(a)(l) and its companion subsections place re- 
strictions on certain types of business conduct that have a coer- 
cive or restraining effect on employees' exercise of section 7 
100. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. at 270. 
101. The Court acknowledged the general attitude among, the courts of appeals 
which had "generally assumed that a complete cessation of business will remove an em- 
ployer from future coverage by the Act." Id. at 270-71. "The Act 'does not compel a 
person to become or remain an employee. It does not compel one to become or remain an 
employer.'" Id. at 271 (quoting Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 
1963)). 
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rights. In enforcing the NLRA, the Board is called upon to bal- 
ance the respective interests of management and labor. An em- 
ployer's interest in achieving particular business objectives is 
weighed against the corresponding impact on employees' rights 
under the NLRA. Conduct that tends to coerce or interfere with 
section 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor practice unless the 
coercive impact is both slight and merely incidental to the 
pursuit of legitimate management objectives. In the balancing 
process, anti-union animus is a significant factor "When an em- 
ployer is motivated by anti-union animus, the danger of interfer- 
ence with the alarm that employees will feel about the exercise 
of Section 7 rights is always increased."lo2 
Employer lawsuits potentially impact on employees' exer- 
cise of section 7 rights. However the Board recognized in Clyde 
Taylor the paramount importance of an employer's right to in- 
voke the legal process and announced that it would accommo- 
date its enforcement of the NLRA to the right of employers to 
litigate their claims in court. The Board rejected the traditional 
balancing approach, which among other things, weighed the mo- 
tive and intent underlying an employer's resort to legal 
processes. Although a threat to sue if employees did not aban- 
don their section 7 rights continued to be an unfair labor prac- 
tice, the actual filing of a lawsuit was left unscathed by the stat- 
utory restrictions of section 8.1°a 
The Board's gradual departure from the literal interpreta- 
tion of Clyde Taylor, culminating in Power Systems, Inc., repre- 
sents a rejection of sound public policy. The Board's implicit re- 
liance on an abuse of process theory is not well founded since 
anti-union animus alone is insufficient to corrupt an otherwise 
valid lawsuit. There can be no abuse of process absent collateral 
conduct that deviates from the normal pursuit of a legal claim to 
its designed end. The Board errs in labeling anti-union motiva- 
tion an "unlawful objective" in order to invalidate a lawsuit as 
102. Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A 
Rationale-Part 11, Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in any Labor 
Organization and the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1972) 
(footnote omitted). 
103. The Ninth Circuit has stated without qualification that "the Board consistently 
has held that despite the coercive effect upon employees' statutory rights, the filing of a 
civil suit by an employer or by a union cannot be found to be an unfair labor practice." 
Bergman v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 100,103 (9th Cir. 1978); accord, IAMAW v. United Aircraft 
Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Smith Steel 
Workers v. A.O. Smith Co., 420 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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an abuse of process or a malicious use of process. 
The Board also violates the spirit of Darlington by failing to 
recognize a specific instance of managerial prerogative that lies 
beyond the appropriate reach of motive and intent analysis. 
Clyde Taylor correctly characterized the right to resort to the 
courts as a right deserving strict accommodation by the Board in 
its enforcement of the NLRA. Only strict accommodation binds 
the fallible hands of those who attempt to shape unfair labor 
practices from anti-union animus. 
Val John Christensen 
